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ABSTRACT
The paper identiﬁes trusting problems between autonomous
services in the Internet-of-Services (IoS). This scenario vision describes a general computational paradigm, which allows companies to procure computational resources externally. The arising conﬂicting interests between providers
and consumers lead to strategic behaviour of single services.
Usually trust and reputation models are proposed to set incentives for acting honestly. But when using Double Auctions to match buyers and sellers, these trust and reputation
models fail to close this “trusting gap”. This paper proposes
a modiﬁed Double Auction protocol fulﬁlling the deducted
requirements. Simulation experiments show that the usage
of this modiﬁed protocol leads to increased trustworthiness
for the participants.

1. INTRODUCTION
The increasing dynamic of markets leads for companies to
the need of adapting their processes to continuously changing environment. For every-day business, the use of computationally intensive information technology (IT) seems essential to implement new ﬂexible business models within a
short time.
The Internet-of-Services (IoS) describes a general computational paradigm, which allows companies to procure computational resources externally and thus to save both internal
capital expenditures and operational costs. The notion of
Internet-of-Services follows the idea of consuming diﬀerent
services externally, provided by distinct Service Providers
(SP), but from a blurred cloud of resources within a single
business unit or even between diﬀerent businesses [10]. As
the interaction frequency is assumed to be very high and
the volume of a single interaction is assumed to be very
small, the whole process has to be fulﬁlled without human
interaction. The process includes ﬁnding a suitable SP, negotiating with it, invoking the service and fulﬁlling some
post-processing steps if necessary.

To match providers and consumers, an eﬃcient allocation
mechanism between service demand and supply is needed:
a market [28]. But introducing a market will lead to other
problems, for example asymmetrically distributed information between SPs and consumers. SPs usually have more
information about quality or availability of the services they
provide, than Service Consumers (SC). Further, the eﬀectively provided functionality might diﬀer from the promised
functionality. This case of asymmetrically distributed information usually leads to suboptimal results due to the uncertainty on the consumer side, and thus to an inferior usage
of the service environment in total. Contrarily, consumers
have more information about their liquidity. In addition,
both interaction participants deal with uncertainty caused
by environmental factors (for example network failures).
One common way to overcome this asymmetrical information distribution is the usage of trust and reputation models [13]. The own experiences, experiences from other participants or just gossiping received from other participants
about a target service can inﬂuence one’s behaviour. The
usage of trust and reputation models is quite common in decentralized environments, because no central entity has to
be implemented that has central knowledge or even central
control.
From Electronic Commerce research diﬀerent payment models are “known”: the pay-before model determines the payment before a service invocation takes place, the pay-later
model works vice versa. The choice of the payment model
directly impairs the direction of the aforementioned asymmetrical information distribution. These models are also
assumed for IoS.
This paper will especially focus on the usage of Double Auctions to coordinate a future IoS. Coordinating sellers and
buyers by a Double Auction means, that there is a central
Auctioneer that receives the bids of sellers and buyers. The
Auctioneer matches these bids following a known algorithm,
which determines the price [22]. Following Streitberger et
al. [28], a Double Auction represents an eﬃcent mechanism
to coordinate resource allocation in service systems.
With this paper we are going to investigate the question if it
is possible to use reputation information in order to achieve
trustworthy interactions in a Double Auction-coordinated
IoS environment. Therefore, the paper is structured as follows: whereas section 2 presents foundations and related
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work for this paper, section 3 explains the proposed design
of the Double Auction protocol. Section 4 demonstrates
and evaluates the proposed protocol in combination with
the AV ALAN CHEdec reputation model. Finally, section 5
concludes the paper and presents future work.

2. FOUNDATIONS AND RELATED WORK
This section presents foundations of the work and related
work. Foundations can be split into the AVALANCHE reputation model, requirements and hypotheses on Double Auctions that are deducted from literature. Related work comprises papers regarding trusting relationships between the
actors Seller, Buyer and Auctioneer.

2.1 AVALANCHE Reputation System
Trust and reputation models have been discussed in research
extensively in the past (see for example [25]). Due to the
simple requirements a reputation model has to fulﬁl as soon
as it is assumed that no cognitive acting humans are directly
involved, we chose a simple mathematical model to discuss
the usage in Double Auctions: “AVALANCHE ”. Discussing
the generalizability of the ﬁndings for other models will be
not part of this paper.
Padovan et al. [19, 20], the authors of the AVALANCHE
system, denote their reputation coeﬃcient as RYX , whereas
X denotes the identity of the rating software agent (Evaluator), and Y denotes the identity of the rated agent (Target). The reputation coeﬃcient obtains values in between
0 ≤ RYX ≤ 1. RYX = 1 denotes the best reputation (target agent seems to be a reliable agent), RYX = 0 denotes a
bad reputation (target seems to be non-cooperative). Per
se the reputation coeﬃcient represents a private value for
each agent, such that two diﬀerent agents might diﬀer in
their coeﬃcient about target agent three: R31 = R32 . “In
general, the reputation coeﬃcient is used to adapt the software agent’s negotiation strategy according to its partner’s
expected cooperative behaviour.” [19, p. 6]
To structure the trust and reputation mechanism, Padovan
et al. distinguish four stages: obtaining the reputation coefﬁcient, adapting this coeﬃcient to the own negotiation strategy, rating the partner’s behaviour after the transaction and
last but not least the distribution of the reputation information.

Table 1: Assessment of price and reputation [19]
I
1
2
3
4

2.1.2

Yi
12
3
16
5

pi
47
52
54
56

RYXi
X
R12
= 0.63
R3X = 0.65
X
R16
= 0.85
R5X = 0.44

2 − RYXi
1.37
1.35
1.15
1.56

p∗i
64.39
70.20
62.10
87.36

rank
2
3
1
4

Adapting Reputation Information to Negotiation Strategies

At the beginning of the negotiation phase (after the information phase) the agent has received a list of potential interaction partners. These oﬀers and the corresponding agents
are ranked in by an assessed oﬀer price p∗Yi that is calculated
based on the initial oﬀered price pYi and its reputation coeﬃcient RYXi : p∗Yi = pYi + (RYXi ∗ 0 + (1 − RYXi ) ∗ pYi ) =
pYi ∗ (2 − RYXi )
Table 1 illustrates one example with four oﬀers. The agent
X starts to negotiate with partner number 16. If this negotiation fails, X will negotiate with number 12 [19].

2.1.3

Rating Cooperative Behaviour

After each settlement phase of a transaction, the agents are
able to rate each other. This value is denoted by the authors
with rj , whereas j represents the index of the transaction.
Successful transactions are rated with rj = 1 (best value),
unsuccessful transaction are rated with rj = 0 (worst value)
[19].

2.1.4

Distribution and Updating

This obtained rating value rj updates the reputation coefﬁcients of the involved transaction partners X and Y . To
emphasis latest ratings compared to older ones, the authors
use an average weighting calculation with a weighting factor
α. This weighting factor can be instantiated by the agent
owner. Following, the new reputation value is calculated as
follows: RYXi = RYXi −1 ∗ (1 − α) + rj ∗ α. If a global reputation agency is used (centralized model), a global value for α
has to be deﬁned. Based on the assumptions on future IoS
environments we avoid using a central unit that coordinates
the reputation values.

Within the obtaining stage, Padovan et al. [20] identify
three diﬀerent cases: The target agent is unknown for all
agents. In this case the agent has to estimate the risk of an
interaction with the target. To do that, the authors propose
as an alternative to a default value between 0 and 1 the average value of all known reputation values. If no reputation
value is available (ﬁrst interaction), a default value has to
be chosen.

The main diﬀerence of a decentralized to a centralized reputation mechanism is not the concept itself. Instead the process of exchanging reputation information increases in its
complexity. While in a centralized model, as AVALANCHE
represents one, the reputation unit manages all published
reputation information, in a decentralized model neighboured
agents have to be requested for information on other participants. Each participant has to manage reputation information for its own. In order to extend the initial AVALANCHE
model to the decentralized version AV ALAN CHEdec , we
just have to modify the reputation communication process.

If the agent has already made personal experiences with the
target, the agent can use its personal own information about
the target’s cooperative behaviour and eventually take further information from others, for example if this information
is not reliable.

For the remaining paper, we are assuming the decentralized
version of the reputation model. That model has been validated against the original model within the SimIS [15] environment before conducting the simulation experiments. The
used replication methodology follows the replication replica-

2.1.1 Obtaining Reputation Information
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tion process model of Sansores and Pavon [27] and bases on
experiments and corresponding simulation data of [19]. The
result of this replication has been positive.

2.2 Hypotheses on Double Auctions and Reputation Usage
In order to deﬁne the requirements for the research artifact
[12], we will present the hypotheses that have been deducted
from literature review in König et al. [16] (see table 2). The
table combines the negotiation roles Service Provider (SP),
Service Consumer (SC) and Auctioneer (Auct.) with the two
possible payment models pay-before and pay-later. Using
one of the two payment models determines whether the SC
or the SP role acts as trustee (has cheating possibility).
Agents acting strategically regarding the reputation model
usage might have diﬀerent interests regarding the process of
generating and distributing ratings. This includes the rating of target agents and the memetic acting, that means
participating in gossiping. This subsection considers the
overlapping of the reputation roles describing the agents’
participation in the overall reputation process.
In their work, Conte and Paolucci [11] deﬁne the four diﬀerent agent roles as follows:
• The set M is a group of agents that sends information
to other agents.
• Set E are all agents which evaluate a certain target T.
• Set T, on the other side, are the agents which are evaluated by E.
• Finally, set B is deﬁned as a group of beneﬁciaries that
beneﬁt from the evaluations performed by the evaluators (set E ) about the targets (set T ) that can be
spread through the memetic agents (set M ). The beneﬁciaries beneﬁt from it as they receive information
about the degree to which the target conforms with
the social norm. [11, p. 74 et seqq.]
As soon as two or more roles overlap, certain eﬀects regarding the reputation model can occur [11]. For us, especially
two hypotheses are of interest:
H1: B  E, B ∩T = E ∩T = ∅: The overlapping of the sets
B and E and the non-overlapping of T lead to working
reputation system, because participants are motivated
to provide their own experiences, the reputation system works well.
H2: B ∩ T, B ∩ E = E ∩ T = ∅: As soon as all sets are
disjunctive from each other, the participants have no
incentives to participate at the reputation system.
Even if we implement a model like AV ALAN CHEdec , it is
not possible to gain an adequate system when using Double
Auctions. The problem in this case is that neither the SC
nor the SP are fulﬁlling the Beneﬁciary role. Instead, only
the Auctioneer in terms of a Double Auction might beneﬁt
from correct ratings due to a higher fulﬁlment of its users’
expectations.
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Table 2: Reputational Conﬁgurations in Double Auctions
(following [16])

Negot.
DA
DARep

2.3

Trustee

SP

SC

Auct.

H1

H2

SP
SC
SP
SC

T
E
T
E,B

E
T
E,B
T

B
B

No
No
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
No
No

Requirements on Trustworthy Double Auctions in the IoS

The mechanism this work is going to design and develop
should focus on the trust relation between the set of buyers
and the set of sellers. In addition, the coordination mechanism should be denoted by a Double Auction.
R 0 The mechanism to design must focus on the trusting
relationship between the set of sellers and the set of
buyers. Further, a Double Auction mechanism has to
be used in order to ﬁll the identiﬁed research gap.
In order to reach H1 instead of H2, we have do ﬁnd a conﬁguration of the Double Auction protocol that shifts the B
role (Beneﬁciary) from the Auctioneer to the SC in the paybefore case and respectively to the SP in the pay-later case
(see table 2). If it is possible to design such a mechanism,
the trustor can use reputation information in order to choose
negotiation partners. For the trustee on the other hand, this
information is not important as it can not be cheated during
the interaction. We will hold this requirement as following:
R 1 The trustor must be able to use its information on the
reliability of the matched partner or the partner to
match in order to beneﬁt from this information.
In order to design the mechanism as ﬂexible as possible, it
should be resistant against a change in the payment model.
This means that a change of the payment model from paylater to pay-before should have no eﬀect on the system and
vice versa. If the mechanism would be able to fulﬁl this
requirement, a change of the payment model would not determine major changes in mechanism design. Further, the
required ﬂexibility regarding the trustor-trustee relationship
will enable a pay-later or a pay-before or even an arbitrary
combination of both models.
R 2 The protocol to be designed should work in a symmetric way in order to stay ﬂexible to changes in the
trustee-trustor relationship. This change can be determined by the change of the payment model.
The Auctioneer has to follow clear rules in order not to
adulterate the economic outcome of the matching process.
That is, the decision for matching a SC and a SP should
be made by each side based on the reliability, which is indicated by the available trust and reputation information.

The decision should not be possible based on price information. More concrete, as soon as SP and SC are matched,
each side should be able to refuse the partner based on its
information on the former behaviour and not on the price.
R 3 SP and SC must be able to decide on the acceptance of
an oﬀer based on the former behaviour of the opponent
and not based on the price of the matching (see for
example [34])

2.4 Trusting Relationships between Auctioneer, Seller and Buyer
Within this subsection, we are going to consider approaches
that regard the trusting relations between the Auctioneer,
the set of sellers and the set of buyers. Figure 1 illustrates
the three diﬀerent emerging trusting relationships [30].
Auctioneer
Trusting
rus
Auctioneer
nee
Securing Bidding

Buyer

Seller
Trustworthy
t
Competing

Trustworthy
Interacting

Trustworthy
usttw
Competing

Figure 1: Classiﬁcation of Competing Approaches, in analogy to [30, p. 145]

The ﬁrst category regards the trusting relationship between
the role of an Auctioneer and the role of bidders. Bidders
can be divided into the set of sellers and the set of buyers.
These groups are integrated to the group of bidders due to
the fact that the trust relation does not diﬀer between the
set of sellers and the set of buyers.
Franklin and Reiter [14] mention in their work some of the
most important challenges when designing electronic auctions with an Auctioneer instance: the Auctioneer can inform a collaborator regarding submitted bids, the closing
time could be manipulated, such that interested bidders
are not able to submit their intended bids, the Auctioneer could accept bids after the closing time, the Auctioneer
could award the auction to another bidder than the winning
bidder, the Auctioneer could collect money from the nonwinning bidders and ﬁnally the winner could refuse to pay
to the Auctioneer [14].
The same authors propose a mechanism for sealed bid auctions that ensures that bids are not revealed until the bidding period has been ended, the Auctioneer collects the
money for the service from the winner. All other bidders are
ensured that they do not have to pay and only the winner
is able to consume the negotiated service [14]. Franklin and
Reiter ensure this by the usage of cryptographic techniques.
Brandt [4] speciﬁes this approach for Vickrey Auctions. In
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second price auctions the Auctioneer has an additional cheating opportunity. It could increase the second-highest bid in
order to increase the eﬀective price the winner has to pay.
The mechanism of Brandt [4] considers especially the highest and the second price in Vickrey Auctions. Later, the
same author proposes a mechanism in which the Auctioneer
becomes obsolete as the bids are shared on all bidders [5].
This might solve the trusting problem between Auctioneer
and bidders. Brandt [6] also proposes a mechanism for the
(M+1)st price mechanism that is also used here in this paper. The author proposes a technique based on the El Gammal encryption. Following this mechanism, a trusted third
party can substitute the trusting relationship between bidders and Auctioneer. A similar approach has been proposed
by Baudron et al. [2]. An overview of cryptographic approaches without a trusted third party is given by Bogetoft
et al. [3]. Wang [31] considers the problem of anonymity
in Continuous Double Auctions and the traceability of false
oﬀers in this kind of Double Auctions.
The next category of trust relationships goes beyond the
analysis of Turel and Yuan [30] (see ﬁgure 1). It is the
trust relationship between participants within the groups of
seller or buyers. Brandt and Weiss [7] name participants,
which behave in a fashion that they reduce the proﬁt of
competitors, “antisocial” agents. These agents follow this
goal beside the goal of maximizing the own proﬁt. Following Brandt and Weiss, these agents “need to deviate from the
dominant truth-telling strategy” [7, p. 335]. Among other
researchers, Sandholm [26] adresses the problem of truthbidding by the usage of the Clarke-Groves pricing mechanism, a generalized Vickrey auction. Zhou and Zheng generalize the truth-bidding for Double Auctions in their framework, called TRUST [34].
Finally, we are going to consider the category that represents
the focus of this work: the trust relationship between the
both bidder groups: seller (SP) and buyer (SC). This problem has been identiﬁed and examined by Braynov and Sandholm [8]. In a subsequent work the same authors address,
beyond others, this problem [9], but use a single-sided Vickrey auction (in our terms: Auction) to solve this problem.
Ramchurn [23] proposes a mechanism to ensure a trusted relation between sellers and buyers, but he also makes use of
single-sided auctions. Tafreschi et al. [29] assume the same
problem. But within their proposal to solve this problem
they make use of a Fixed Price Auction protocol.
Summarizing, we can state that none of the existing approaches focuses the trusting relation between sellers and
buyers within a Double Auction. They fail to meet requirement R0. We will now propose a design that allows to address the trusting problem within Double Auctions. Therefore, the Negotiation Protocol module has to be modiﬁed
and the interface for agents to make decisions has to be designed.

3.

DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT

Following the Design Science process of Peﬀers et al. [21],
the protocol is now designed. But before describing the results of this process in this paper, we will consider the underlying assumptions.

3.1 Assumptions and Simulation Environment
The approach assumes that participants might defect the
system through not answering the service or payment requests not as expected. The Matcher, instead, is assumed
to always act honestly. Keeping related work in mind, this
assumption could be dropped in future. Further, no trusted
third party for example to fulﬁl the payment process is available. Finally, the decision, if a trustee is playing honest or
fraudulent, is modeled as a binary decision, that is the services can be clearly divided into honest and cheating services.

3.2 Protocol
In order to meet the requirements, the Double Auction protocol has to be re-designed. In this approach, the Matcher
makes use of the (M+1)st price rule. The (M+1)st price rule
sets the clearing price (the price buyers have to pay and suppliers earn) at the (M+1)st highest price of all bids [33]. For
reasons of simplicity, the focus of the protocol will lie on the
matched participants only: in case of the unmatched bidder,
the Matcher sends a “Lost” message to the set of unmatched
SPs and the set of unmatched SCs. For these participants
the current Double Auction round is ﬁnished without success. In this case no trusting relationship occurs due to the
failed attempt to ﬁnd a suitable partner (to consume or to
provide a service).
The protocol proposal is illustrated in ﬁgure 2 in terms of
an UML sequence diagram. The process starts with an announcement of a new Auction round by the Matcher. Sending this broadcast message simpliﬁes the service discovery
process that is also a necessary part of the service life cycle. The process of how to ﬁnd a service that promises the
desired functionality is assumed to work. That means that
the functionality can be exactly described with underlying
service descriptions and the Matcher will only match with
SPs and SCs that have equal service or demand descriptions.
Within the following simulation the service is denoted by a
textual string that represents the unique service and demand
description.
The negotiation process starts with the aforementioned Callfor-Bids message that is sent by a broadcast message delivery to all participants. As soon as the SP has resources
available to oﬀer, it will answer this Call-for-Bids message
with a Sell message. Symmetrically, the SC answers in case
of an open demand the Call-for-Bids message with a Buy
message. Both answer messages have to include the price
for the proposal. For the SP the price denotes the lowest
bid on which it will provide the service. For the SC on the
other side, the price denotes the maximum price it is willing
to pay for the service.
The Matcher follows the (M+1)st price matching algorithm
[33] and stores the proposals in the corresponding proposal
sets. In periodic matching proceedings, the proposals are
matched regarding the (M+1)st price matching and price
determination rule.
The matched services and demands instead, are notiﬁed by a
Ask-if-Opp-Is-Ok message. This message includes the name
of the matched opponent. The message does not include the
(M+1)st price, such that no economic side eﬀects can occur,
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Figure 2: Modiﬁed Double Auction Protocol
i.e. refusing the matching due to the high or low price.
The Matcher stores the matched pairs in a new data structure. This data structure is able to store additional ﬂags
for each participant that denotes the fact if the corresponding agent has already conﬁrmed the matching. The decision
whether to conﬁrm the matching or not, can be made by
each agent on individual preferences: if the matched agent is
suﬃcienty trustworthy, the matching is accepted, otherwise
it is rejected. This decision point represents the interface to
a potential usage of a trust and/or reputation mechanism
to conﬁrm the decision with more information, here on historic behaviour of the service or participant. The individual
preference is modelled by an individual threshold that determines this decision.
As soon as the matched SP and the corresponding SC accepted the matching and announced this with an ACK message to the Matcher, the Matcher sends the ﬁnal Sold message to both sides. This message includes the price on which
oﬀer and demand have been matched. At this point the
agent can inﬂuence its future personal strategy regarding
the negotiation itself and can increase or decrease its estimated market price.

4. DEMONSTRATION AND EVALUATION
4.1 Simulation Environment
In order to evaluate the mechanism later, we have to introduce a simulation environment, called SimIS [15], that follows the IoS vision. This system is able to model Internetlike networks where the nodes are hosting active services.

As just mentioned, the topology will again be divided into an
Infrastructure Layer consisting of nodes and edges between
them, and an Application Layer. The network used for simulation experiments consists of 100 nodes that are connected
not heavy-weighted and not long-tailed. The mean distance
between the nodes is about 3.26 with an maximum distance
between two nodes of six hops.

Application Layer

Infrastructure Layer

Figure 3: SimIS Architecture [15]

The messages follow the SOAP messages structure and the
service interfaces follow real-world Web Services technology,
like discussed in Lee and Winslett [17]. These interfaces
conform to the widle-used interaction protocols in service
economies.

4.1.1 Technological Base: Repast Toolkit

The SimIS1 toolkit was implemented as an extension to the
Recursive Porous Agent Simulation Toolkit [24], developed
at the Argonne National Lab, Chicago. Repast is a free and
open source agent-based modelling toolkit [18]. This foundation was chosen due to its comprehensive API, the very
generic and easy to use set of data gathering and analysis
functions as well as the support for network modelling (including respective programming libraries). Technically, the
current version of SimIS is based on Repast Symphony and is
completely implemented in the Java programming language.

4.1.2 SimIS Architecture
In order to map the abstract IoS architecture to our simulation model a two-tiered architecture for SimIS seems suitable. The overall system is thus divided into an Application
Layer and an Infrastructure Layer. An overview of the overall architecture is illustrated in Figure 3.
The Infrastructure Layer models topological settings of the
IoS. The basic idea is that all Application Layer Agents or
Services are linked to a single Infrastructure Agent each,
which is representing their server platform. This platform
is therefore responsible for sending messages to other Application Layer Agents (including routing and communication
patterns, such as broad- or multicast), and receiving messages from other Infrastructure Agents and passing them on
to either other Infrastructure Agents (in case the agent represents only the next step on the message’s route) or to one
or more Application Layer Agents associated with it (in case
these are the recipients) [15].
Within the Application Layer the actual services of the IoS
vision are modelled. Basically the underlying Infrastructure Layer provides us with a high-enough ﬂexibility for implementing any service logic in terms of Application Layer
Agents communicating via the oﬀered message objects and
routing functionality. Each service (Application Layer Agent)
is implemented as a plain Java class and can therefore exploit the full potential this programming language oﬀers in
addition to the libraries present within the SimIS toolkit.

4.2 Simulation Experiments
4.2.1 Simulation Scenario
1

For the following simulation experiments, 200 SP agents and
200 SC agents will be deployed at the beginning of the simulation experiment. In order to introduce dynamics, participants are substituted by newcomers during the simulation
experiments. The time range for the substitution process
is set to a value that in average the complete population of
agents is replaced once during one simulation experiment of
100,000 time ticks. Depending on the payment model 10%
SP cheaters or 10% SC cheaters are deployed. This rate
might ﬂuctuate due to the dynamic character of the system.
For each simulation setting, the products that are negotiated are ﬁxed by a certain functional attribute deﬁnition.
This attribute combination is assumed to be deﬁned by an
underlying service description. The one and only attribute
that is negotiated is denoted by the price. The negotiation
protocol is determined by a (M+1)st price Double Auction.

4.2.2

Metrics

As the simulation scenario has been deﬁned, the metrics for
the simulation experiments are introduced now. The fulﬁlment rate and the negotiation rate are plotted in dependence
of the simulation time.
The concrete implementation of the fulﬁlment depends on
the payment model of the simulation experiment. If the service has to be payed in advance, the fulﬁlment rate considers

servicesreceived
i
the service fulﬁlment: f r = i|SCs|
. For each
paid
servicesi

participant the rate of successful services against failed services are noted. Without any reputation system, one would
expect that the service fulﬁlment rate corresponds to the
rate of cheaters in the system. If the service has to be payed
after it has been fulﬁlled, the fulﬁlment rate considers the
payment fulﬁlment. Then, for each SP the rate of successful
payments against failed payments are plotted over time.
The negotiation rate is deﬁned very close to the fulﬁlment
rate. While the latter focuses on the service and payment
fulﬁlment, the negotiation rate focuses on the rate of negotiation processes that have been ﬁnsihed successfully: nr =
|SCs| negotiationfi inished
. The outcome of the fulﬁlment afi
negotiationstarted
i

terwards is not relevant for this metric. In a system with a
well-working reputation system the negotiation rate of defecting agents will fall down as soon as they are identiﬁed,
and the other participants will not be willing to negotiate
with them any more. If the trust and reputation system does
not work properly, the rates might not diﬀer at all between
honest and cheating participants. The deﬁnition when a negotiation begins, depends on the negotiation protocol: in a
Double Auction as soon as a bidder submits a bid to the
Auctioneer is assumed as the negotiation start.
Finally a metric that covers indicators that base on the ne-

For more information see http://simis.sourceforge.net
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Figure 4: Double Auction Fulﬁlment Rate

Figure 5: Negotiation Rates in modiﬁed Double Auction

gotiation and trustworthiness will be introduced: fairness.
While the negotiation and fulﬁlment rate will be plotted
over time, this metric will analyse the agent population at
the end of each experiment. When plotting the investments
or revenues against the amount of services, fairness can be
deﬁned in a distribution close to the bisecting line (assuming similar valuations) [32]. The gradient of the bisecting
line is determined by the valuation. To ensure the applicability of this metric in both trustor/trustee relationships,
we will evaluate the deviation of a population by the root
mean square deviation to the expected bisecting line. A deviation value of 0 for the whole polulation would denote a
complete “fair” system, whereas a high deviation value denotes an “unfair” system. The deviation is calculated by the
root mean square error that measures the diﬀerences of the
measured values against the expected (fair) values.

nario’s simulation experiments. The ﬁgure denotes the payment fulﬁlment in the pay-later and the service fulﬁlment
in the pay-before model. As we have again 10% of cheating
agents, the fulﬁlment rate is expected at about 90%. As we
have seen above, the reference case (initial Double Auction
protocol) fulﬁls the expectation with a constant fulﬁlment
rate of about 90% (dark area).

4.2.3 Simulation Results
In the following simulations each single experiment is repeated for 30 times using diﬀerent random valuations and
makes use of the modiﬁed Double Auction Protocol. With
30 replications and uniformly distributed input parameters,
the simulation experiments are expected to satisfy common
statistical requirements. During the data analysis the 0.95
conﬁdence interval of the time series are taken for further
analysis. The simulation outcome is further compared to
the case that uses the initial Double Auction protocol. In
both cases, AV ALAN CHEdec is used as decentralized trust
and reputation model for all participants (SPs and SCs).
Figure 4 illustrates the overall fulﬁlment rate of the sce-
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The grey areas illustrate the service or payment fulﬁlment
rates when using AV ALAN CHEdec , combined with the
modiﬁed protocol. The service fulﬁlment rate increases signiﬁcantly compared to the simulation outcome with the initial Double Auction protocol. Both payment models lead to
analogous results.
A value of approximated 100% is unrealistic due to the following reasons: during the settlement phase of the simulation run the reputation system has to be ﬁlled with information. Within this settlement phase some interactions fail,
such that the rate can not reach the 100% value. Further,
during the simulation runs the implemented dynamics lead
to a continuous arrival of unknown agents.
As we stated above, a working reputation system has to
lead to a spreading of negotiation rates between honest and
dishonest participants. Figure 5 illustrates the negotiation
rates when using the initial or the modiﬁed Double Auction
protocol. Subﬁgure 5a considers the pay-later case where
the SCs are acting as trustees. Determined by the payment
model, these agents are able to cheat the corresponding SPs.
Following, with a well-working trust and reputation model
the negotiation rate of cheating and honestly acting SCs
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Figure 6: Fairness between Service Providers in Double Auctions (pay-later)

Figure 7: Fairness between Complex Service Agents in Double Auctions (pay-before)

should spread.

with fraudsters involved. In consequence, a smaller amount
of SPs are cheated. The root mean square error to the
expected bisection (completely fair system) is denoted by
22.27.

The initial Double Auction protocol does not diﬀerentiate
regarding the negotiation rate between honest and dishonest SCs. As soon as we implement the modiﬁed Double
Auction protocol, the negotiation rate of dishonest SCs decreases over time and spreads compared to the rate of honest SCs (dark area vs. light grey area). This case (modiﬁed
Double Auction, pay-later and AV ALAN CHEdec ) is now a
well-working case regarding the trustworthiness.
The pay-before case is illustrated in ﬁgure 5b. Like in the
pay-later case, an implementation of the modiﬁed protocol
leads to a spreading of negotiation rates. Honest SPs, which
represent the trustees now, are more often able to ﬁnish a
negotiation process compared to cheating SPs (dark area vs.
light grey area). As soon as the initial Double Auction protocol is used to coordinate the services, the negotiation rates
of both SP groups do not diﬀer at all. Demand and supply
are not balanced in the scenario, such that the negotiation
rates diﬀer between SC and SP.
Figures 6 and 7 will now consider the fairness metric when
coordinating the services in an IoS environment by the different Double Auction protocols.
Based on the ﬁndings before, ﬁgure 6a denotes a well-working
combination of the modiﬁed Double Auction protocol with
the pay-later payment model and AV ALAN CHEdec as reputation model. This combination leads to less negotiations
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Figure 6b illustrates the result of the same experiment, but
with the initial Double Auction protocol. Compared to the
simulation experiment with usage of the modiﬁed speciﬁcation, we can immediately see that the reputation information
of AV ALAN CHEdec does not inﬂuence the results. SPs receive less money in relation to the services they delivered.
These cheated agents can be found above this imaginary
bisection. The root mean squared error in this case is with
145.9 higher than in the same experiment using the extended
protocol version.
Based on the ﬁndings before, ﬁgure 7a illustrates the second
well-working combination of the modiﬁed Double Auction
protocol: this time with the pay-later model. Here, the
usage of AV ALAN CHEdec leads to less negotiations with
fraudsters involved. In consequence, a smaller amount of
SPs are cheated. The root mean square error to the desired
bisection is denoted by 20.01. If we use the initial approach
in the pay-before case, the simulation outcome decreases in
its fairness metrics (see ﬁgure 7b). The simulation experiment leads to a root mean squared error of 149.1.
Additional sensitivity analyses show that the model is very
robust against changes in the cheaters rate (up to about
40%) and regarding the amount of services (with more than

50 SPs and SCs). Running simulations for 100,000 ticks ensures that stable system states are reached. Neither increasing the simulation duration, nor changing the reputation
model (for example by using the proposal by Abdul-Rahman
[1]) aﬀect the simulation outcomes.
Summarizing the results of the modiﬁed Double Auction experiments, we can state that both initial hypotheses regarding the Double-sided Auction can be conﬁrmed: when using
the original Double Auction protocol, the instantiation of
AV ALAN CHEdec does not increase the trustworthiness of
the system compared to the expected trustworthiness based
on the cheating probability of trustees. This statement is
unversally valid for both possible payment models and following both trustee/trustor relationships. As soon as we
use the modiﬁed Double Auction protocol, which has been
proposed in this paper, the impact of AV ALAN CHEdec
renders the system more trustworthy and fairness between
agents can be ensured.
If we consider this modiﬁcation again in detail, we can notice that through the additional conﬁrmation an additional
decision point for SCs and SPs has been introduced. For
these participants this additional decision point leads to the
possibility to decide based on trust and reputation information. In terms of the introduced reputation roles, the
trustors become Beneﬁciary of the reputation system, such
that the reputation role overlapping determines a working
system.
In order to close the section on the Demonstration and Evaluation of the modiﬁed protocol combined with the decentralized reputation model AV ALAN CHEdec , we are going to
review the deducted requirements.
R 0 Trusting relationship between Sellers and Buyers: The
proposed mechanism adresses the trust relationship
between the group of sellers (SPs) and buyers (SCs).
This fact becomes obvious when changing the behaviour
regarding the honesty of agents during the evaluation
step. In both payment models, cheating trustees are
detected and indirectly excluded. Further, the modiﬁed protocol is still denoted as Double Auction protocol, such as both groups, sellers and buyers, are bidding on services or demand within the same protocol.
R 1 The trustor is able to use its reputation information:
With the modiﬁcation of the protocol an additional
decision point has been added. All participants can
now decide if they accept the corresponding opponent.
Through this additional possibility the agents are not
confronted with an anonymous amount of agents. Instead they are already clearly allocated to a speciﬁc
partner. Now they are able to use trust and reputation information to make the decision whether to
conﬁrm the matching or not. In terms of the reputational roles, SCs and SPs are now Beneﬁciaries of the
reputation system.
R 2 Mechanism that covers both payment models: Such as
for both sides, buyer and seller, this additional decision
point has been introduced, the protocol is still a symmetric one. The fact that the protocol works well with
both models could be shown within the evaluation.
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R 3 Decision on acceptance must not depend on price information: This requirement can also be denoted as
fulﬁlled. The “Ask-if-opponent-is-Ok” message does
not include any price information. Instead it includes
the name of the opponent, such that the agent is able
to decide based for example on the opponent’s past
behaviour. The price information (in our simulation
the (M+1)st price) is conveyed with the “Sold” message after both partners have conﬁrmed the matching.
This split into two steps avoids an inﬂuence of strategic
economic behaviour at this point.

5.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

The paper identiﬁed trusting problems between autonomous
services in the IoS vision. The IoS envisions a service ecosystem where services are traded without human interactions
and even beyond company boundaries. The conﬂicting interests between participants lead to strategic behaviour of
single actors.
In literature, trust and reputation models are proposed to
set incentives to act honestly. But when using Double Auctions to match buyers and sellers, these trust and reputation models fail to close this “trusting gap”. A theoretical
investigation of the problem has led to the idea to introduce
additional decision points. A modiﬁed Double Auction protocol fulﬁls the deducted requirements. Simulation experiments show that the usage of this modiﬁed protocol leads
to increased trustworthiness for the participants. Concluding, the paper shows that it is possible to close the trusting
gap in Double Auction Markets as soon as the protocol is
modiﬁed as proposed. With a traditional Double Auction
protocol, closing this trusting gap is not possible.
Future work should focus on the independence of the proposed mechanism from the used trust and reputation model.
Even if ﬁrst investigations have been positive, this question needs further investigations in future. Especially sideeﬀects between Double Auction conﬁgurations and reputation model conﬁgurations should be investigated. Further, a
detailed economic investigation of common Double Auction
requirements, like truthful bidding is still to be done.

6.
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